Book Review: Constitutional Federalism in a Nutshell, Second Edition. by David E. Engdahl. by Conkle, Daniel O.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1988
Book Review: Constitutional Federalism in a
Nutshell, Second Edition. by David E. Engdahl.
Daniel O. Conkle
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Conkle, Daniel O., "Book Review: Constitutional Federalism in a Nutshell, Second Edition. by David E. Engdahl." (1988).
Constitutional Commentary. 179.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/179
214 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 5:201 
Penthouse are imagining themselves having intercourse, and notre-
ally having intercourse at all. 
Despite the many passages I have quoted from Feminism Un-
modified, I fear I may not have adequately recreated the aura of 
dementia radiating from this book. I have long suspected that femi-
nism has gotten as far as it has because people simply do not read 
the ipsissimae dixeunt of feminists themselves. So I will close by 
leaving the reader with the quintessence of the MacKinnon 
sensibility: 
To be about to be raped is to be gender female in the process of going about life as 
usual. 
[T]he fight over a definition of obscenity is a fight among men over the best means 
to guarantee male power as a system. 
And now my favorite (no easy decision). As the reader ponders it, 
he might reflect that the book from which it is drawn was lauded in 
the New York Times, and that feminism, unmodified, continues to 
be embraced by a wide segment of the legal, academic, and intellec-
tual community: 
Playboy's articles push their views, including their views of the First Amendment, 
in an expressly sexualized context, and at the same time those articles serve to legiti-
mize what their pictures do to women. Masturbating over the positions taken by 
the women's bodies associates male orgasm with the positions expressed in the arti-
cles. Ever wonder why men are so passionate about the First Amendment? ... I 
must also say that the First Amendment has become a sexual fetish through years 
of absolutist writing in the melodrama mode in Playboy in particular. You know 
those superheated articles where freedom of speech is extolled and its imminent 
repression is invoked. Behaviorally, Playboy's consumers are reading about the 
First Amendment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amend-
ment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amendment, mastur-
bating to the women. 
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL, 
SECOND EDITION. By David E. Engdahl. 1 St. Paul, Mn.: 
West Publishing Co. 1987. Pp. xlv, 411. Paper, $10.95. 
Daniel 0. Conkle 2 
On the back cover of this and other books in its "Nutshell" 
series, West Publishing Company advertises its product as "a suc-
cinct exposition of the law to which a student or lawyer can turn for 
reliable guidance." West might have added that law professors, 
I. Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. 
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most of whom read Nutshells only surreptitiously, tend to dismiss 
these books as far too "succinct" to be truly "reliable" and far too 
"expository" to be worthy of critical attention. I therefore was 
more than a little surprised when the editors of Constitutional Com-
mentary suggested that I not only read this Nutshell, but also re-
view it. 
Whatever the merit of other books in this series, however, Pro-
fessor David Engdahl's book is not a typical Nutshell. At over 400 
pages, it is not especially "succinct." More important, its presenta-
tion is not especially "expository," at least not in the usual sense. 
Professor Engdahl discusses a wide range of matters affecting con-
stitutional federalism, including Congress's legislative powers, pre-
emption, and intergovernmental relations. His overriding purpose, 
however, is to "challenge[ ] the seemingly prevalent impression that 
legal issues of federalism have little substance (and less importance) 
today." And he finds "the most recent utterances" of the Supreme 
Court to be "neither indispensable, nor necessarily useful, in the 
effort to master this branch of Constitutional Law." As a result, the 
"reliability" of Engdahl's work depends as much on the strength of 
his arguments as it does on his descriptions of prevailing judicial 
doctrines. 
Engdahl addresses a broad range of problems, and he offers 
interesting insights on a variety of constitutional issues.3 The most 
intriguing part of the book, however, is its central argument that 
there are-or at least should be-judicially enforceable constitu-
tional limitations on the exercise of congressional power. This ar-
gument is too elaborate and complex to describe in detail, but I can 
sketch a few of its fundamental components. 
Unlike the judicial advocates of "states' rights" in the National 
League of Cities-Garcia line of cases, Engdahl does not rely on the 
tenth amendment, which he concedes to be a truism. 4 Instead, he 
attempts to rehabilitate what Chief Justice Rehnquist recently 
called "one of the greatest 'fictions' of our federal system," the doc-
trine of enumerated congressional powers.5 Engdahl argues that 
3. In a lengthy treatment of dormant commerce clause issues, for example, Engdahl is 
highly critical of the Supreme Court's doctrine, and he asks "whether this entire unhappy 
enterprise is one which the judiciary properly should engage in at all." 
4. Engdahl appears to support the position of the majority in National League of Cities 
and the dissenters in Garcia, but not on the basis of the tenth amendment. Instead, he sug-
gests that at least when Congress adopts regulations that require reliance on the necessary 
and proper clause, state immunity might be appropriate when an application of those regula-
tions to the states would not be "proper" in light of the states' role in our constitutional 
system. See also Engdahl, Sense and Nonsense About State Immunity, 2 CONST. COMM. 93 
(1985). 
5. Rehnquist was an Associate Justice at the time he made this comment. Hodel v. 
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the Constitution's listing of congressional "powers" in fact enumer-
ates permissible "objects" or "subject matters" of regulation. 
Within these areas, Engdahl agrees that Congress can regulate in 
the pursuit of whatever ends it desires, including "police power" 
objectives. For example, Congress can regulate matters actually 
"in" interstate commerce, such as the interstate shipment of hand-
guns, even if Congress's only purpose is to further some aspect of 
the public health, safety, or morals. On the other hand, Engdahl 
makes a unique argument that congressional legislation of this type, 
although constitutionally valid, should not preempt state law that 
conflicts only with Congress's "police power" objectives, and like-
wise, to the same extent, should not give rise to federal immunity 
from state regulation or taxation. Under this reasoning, the activi-
ties of federal agencies and corporations often could be regulated or 
taxed by the states.6 Moreover, Engdahl defines some of Congress's 
enumerated powers, such as its power to tax and its power over 
federally-owned property, much more narrowly than does the mod-
em Supreme Court. 1 
As to matters falling outside of these enumerated areas, Eng-
dahl contends that Congress must rely on the necessary and proper 
clause. Following Marshall's reasoning in McCulloch, Engdahl ar-
gues that Congress can reach these "extraneous" matters only if the 
congressional regulation is a proper "means to effectuate federal 
policy with respect to some legitimate federal concern," such as in-
terstate commerce. Although he accepts the prevailing view that 
courts must defer to rational congressional judgments on what he 
calls the "telic" relationship between means and ends, Engdahl con-
tends that this "rational basis" review is not meaningless, and that 
it sometimes might lead to judicial invalidation. 
More important, Engdahl would increase the potential for in-
validation by imposing two requirements, not generally recognized 
in current doctrine, on congressional regulation pursuant to the 
necessary and proper clause. First, he would impose a "particular-
ity requirement": each particular aspect of congressional regulation 
would have to be supported by the requisite "telic relationship." 
Under this view, Congress could not exercise general control over 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring in the judgment). 
6. See also Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. CoLO. L. REv. 51 
(1973). 
7. Engdahl in fact maintains that article IV's property clause(§ 3, cl. 2) should not be 
read to confer an enumerated legislative power at all, but only the power of a proprietor. See 
generally Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283 
(1976). 
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an "extraneous" subject matter, such as mining, merely because 
that subject matter substantially affected a "legitimate federal con-
cern," such as interstate commerce. Instead, each particular con-
gressional control of a local activity like mining would be "valid 
only if that particular control effect[ed] Congress' goal for interstate 
commerce." Engdahl thus criticizes the Supreme Court's compan-
ion decisions in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation 
Association and Hodel v. Indiana, in which the Justices upheld the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 without en-
gaging in a "telic relationship" inquiry for each of the numerous 
regulations in the Act. 
Second, Engdahl would impose a closely related requirement 
of "actual" congressional purpose, which would permit the courts 
to uphold congressional regulation under the necessary and proper 
clause only if there were "some sufficient indication that Congress 
did have a legitimate objective, perceived the telic connection, and 
acted upon that ground." For example, Congress constitutionally 
could prohibit the local sale of dangerously flammable illuminating 
oil in order to make interstate shipping safer for other products, but 
not to protect consumers. On the other hand, so long as Congress 
had a permissible purpose in this sense, the presence of other, "po-
lice power" objectives-even if those other objectives were the pre-
dominant reasons for the legislation-would not make the law 
invalid. Engdahl even concedes, moreover, that the necessary and 
proper clause permits what some would regard as a "bootstrap." 
Thus, Congress would be permitted to regulate an "extraneous" 
matter as a means to effectuate a regulation falling within the area 
of enumerated congressional concerns, even if the latter regulation 
itself were designed to further "police power" objectives. For in-
stance, Congress could prohibit the "manufacture or local sale of 
... handguns ... as a means to effectuate [a congressional] prohibi-
tion of their interstate shipment," even if the prohibition on inter-
state shipment were "itself targeted at reducing local handgun 
crimes (an extraneous end)." Relying on this theory, Engdahl sup-
ports the Supreme Court's arguably "bootstrap" reasoning in 
United States v. Darby. 
In both his general framework and his application of that 
framework to particular constitutional issues, Engdahl presents an 
analysis that is intellectually sophisticated. He constructs an intri-
cate model with a number of interrelated components, and he ap-
plies this model to a variety of different constitutional problems. 
But one leaves the book doubting whether Engdahl's suggested ap-
proach is one that ought to be embraced. 
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Although Engdahl advocates a renewed emphasis on judicially 
enforceable limitations on congressional action, he defends most of 
the Supreme Court's modern decisions upholding the exercise of 
congressional power. To be sure, his reasoning often differs sub-
stantially from the Court's. But this may only suggest that he 
paints an analytical picture far more complex than is necessary to 
explain or justify the Court's decisionmaking. 
To the extent that Engdahl's approach would make a differ-
ence, moreover, his reasoning is far from compelling. In light of his 
other concessions, Engdahl's related requirements of "particular-
ity" and "actual purpose" under the necessary and proper clause 
would not appear to impose any meaningful substantive limits on 
the types of legislative policies that Congress could pursue. Instead, 
they would impose nothing more than procedural and evidentiary 
burdens, which Congress could meet by carefully structuring its leg-
islative action to comply with Engdahl's model. Even if Congress 
could not satisfy Engdahl's necessary and proper clause require-
ments in furtherance of a given enumerated power, some other enu-
merated power, either alone or in conjunction with the necessary 
and proper clause, usually would be available to accomplish the 
same substantive result. Engdahl nonetheless defends the burdens 
that he would impose on the theory that "[a]n important function of 
constitutional doctrine is to make the political process do its work. 
It erects conceptual hurdles- deliberately artificial obstacles- to 
impede precipitous majoritarian action by multiplying (and isolat-
ing from transient issues) the points on which majority agreement 
must be reached." Beyond a general suggestion that liberty is en-
hanced when Congress finds it difficult to operate, however, Eng-
dahl offers no justification for imposing "deliberately artificial 
obstacles" on the adoption of legislation that Congress determines 
to be in the national interest. 
Some of Engdahl's arguments do call for limitations on the ex-
ercise of national law-making power that might not easily be over-
come through calculated legislative maneuvering. His novel 
position concerning the limits of preemption and federal immunity, 
for example, would have significant doctrinal implications, as would 
his narrow definitions of Congress's power to tax and its power to 
control federally-owned property. Through the use of different leg-
islative strategies, Congress could circumvent some of the barriers 
that these doctrinal changes would erect, but others might be diffi-
cult to overcome. In any event, Engdahl makes no meaningful ef-
fort to explain why we should accept the restrictive approaches that 
he advocates. 
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Engdahl has written an intellectually stimulating book that 
contains a number of interesting and useful ideas. At the same 
time, despite its own suggestions to the contrary, the book also ful-
fills the role of a more conventional Nutshell by providing helpful 
explanations of the evolution and modem status of various constitu-
tional doctrines. 
Engdahl's goal for his book, however, is more ambitious, for he 
attempts not only to describe, but also to defend, a scheme of judi-
cially enforced limitations on congressional power. Yet in the con-
text of federalism, no less than elsewhere, we need to know why the 
judiciary should be restricting the operation of the legislative pro-
cess. If the appeal is to the wisdom of the framers, we need to know 
whether their judgments are still wise in the 1980s, and, if not, why 
their intentions should nonetheless continue to control. If the ap-
peal is not so much to the framers as to functional considerations 
guiding the proper operation of our modem democracy, this func-
tional analysis must be set forth and defended. Engdahl makes no 
serious effort on either fronts As a result, his attempt to shore up 
the law of constitutional federalism is incomplete, and therefore un-
successful, because such an effort cannot succeed without a more 
persuasive theoretical foundation. 
STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS. By David M. O'Brien.1 New York, N.Y.: 
W. W. Norton & Company. 1986. Pp. 384. Cloth, $18.95; 
Paper, $9.95. 
Jeffrey Brandon Morris2 
Professor David M. O'Brien has brought forth a readable but 
serious book about the Supreme Court, appropriate for adoption in 
undergraduate upper division courses, or as collateral reading in 
law school courses in constitutional law, or simply as an introduc-
tion to the Court for intelligent laymen. From the perspective of a 
8. Indeed, his argument that the judiciary should enforce significant limitations on the 
power of Congress seems at least somewhat at odds with his critique of the Supreme Court's 
dormant commerce clause doctrine. In the course of that critique, he contends that "when 
debatable choices must be made among competing public interests, or between public and 
competing private interests, one might well wonder whether they ought not be made through 
the political rather than the judicial process," and he adds that "interests locally disadvan-
taged do have political representation in Congress." 
I. Associate Professor, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of 
Virginia. 
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. 
